In recent years, neuroscience research spent much effort in revealing brain activity related to metacognition. Despite this endeavor, it remains unclear exactly when metacognitive experiences develop during task performance. To investigate this, the current study used EEG to temporally and spatially dissociate task-related activity from metacognitive activity. In a masked priming paradigm, metacognitive experiences of difficulty were induced by manipulating congruency between prime and target. As expected, participants more frequently rated incongruent trials as difficult and congruent trials as easy, while being completely unable to perceive the masked primes. Results showed that both the N2 and the P3 ERP components were modulated by congruency, but that only the P3 modulation interacted with metacognitive experiences. Single-trial analysis additionally showed that the magnitude of the P3 modulation by congruency accurately predicted the metacognitive response. Source localization indicated that the N2 task-related activity originated in the ACC, whereas the P3-interplay between taskrelated activation and metacognitive experiences originated from the precuneus. We conclude that taskrelated activity can be dissociated from later metacognitive processing.
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Introduction
When acting upon stimuli in the environment, our actions are accompanied by metacognitive experiences. For example, when typing on a foreign keyboard, you will clearly experience that your actions do not proceed very fluently. While the neurocognitive underpinnings of metacognition have recently received a lot of attention (Fleming et al., 2014 (Fleming et al., , 2010 McCurdy et al., 2013) , it remains unclear how these metacognitive experiences develop in time. For example, it is highly debated whether metacognitive experiences associated with our actions are created at the same time of the decision to act, or whether they also depend on new information arriving beyond this decision point (Yeung and Summerfield, 2012) . More generally, it is unknown at which point in time specific neural processes contribute to the creation of metacognitive experiences.
Metacognition, a general term used to describe the subjective experiences associated with our actions, has been studied in a variety of research fields. In the meta-memory literature, researchers have extensively investigated subjective experiences associated with memory formation, such as judgments-of-learning during acquisition (Metcalfe and Finn, 2008) , and feeling-ofknowing during recall (e.g., Díaz et al., 2007) . In the neurocognitive literature, most studies use low-level perceptual decision tasks, and examine the degree of confidence associated with decisions (de Gardelle and Mamassian, 2014; Fleming and Lau, 2014; Fleming et al., 2010) or the awareness of having made an error in the decision process (Boldt and Yeung, 2015; Steinhauser and Yeung, 2010 ). In the current study, we focus on one particular class of metacognitive experiences, namely the experience of fluency in action-selection. Several recent studies already demonstrated that participants can reliably introspect on the fluency of their actionselection, even when they are unaware of the stimuli manipulating the fluency of selection. For example, Charles et al. (2013) showed that participants could differentiate between correct and incorrect judgments in a simple decision task, even though they did not perceive the stimulus they had to decide on. In a similar vein, studies have used subliminal priming to create a conflict between two responses, and observed that task performance and perceived difficulty were jointly influenced, without participants being 
